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Preferential choices are often explained using models within the evidence accumulation framework: value5
drives the drift rate at which evidence is accumulated until a threshold is reached and an option is chosen.6
Although rarely stated explicitly, almost all such models assume that decision makers have knowledge at the7
onset of the choice of all available attributes and options. In reality however, choice information is viewed8
piece-by-piece, and is often not completely acquired until late in the choice, if at all. Across four eye-tracking9
experiments, we show that whether the information was acquired early or late is irrelevant in predicting choice:10
all that matters is whether or not it was acquired at all. Models with potential alternative assumptions were11
posited and tested, such as 1) accumulation of instantaneously available information or 2) running estimates12
as information is acquired. These provided poor fits to the data. We are forced to conclude that participants13
either are clairvoyant, accumulating using information before they have looked at it, or delay accumulating14
evidence until very late in the choice, so late that the majority of choice time is not time in which evidence is ac-15
cumulated. Thus, although the evidence accumulation framework may still be useful in measurement models,16
it cannot account for the details of the processes involved in decision making.17
In simple decision tasks, participants make a series of choices between two options, while researchers strive to18
explain their responses and reaction times1,2. The dominant account of these tasks is evidence accumulation, which19
characterises decision making as a process of updating a running total of evidence, either in favour of each option, or20
the relative evidence of an option compared to its competitor. A response is initiated once the evidence exceeds the21
decision maker’s pre-defined threshold. Often, this process is simplified by using discrete time steps. Although the22
precise specifications of accumulation models vary, at a minimum they all include three key concepts. The drift rate is23
the mean rate at which the evidence of a given accumulator changes on each time step. The boundary is the threshold24
value at which evidence accumulation stops and a response is made. The non-decision time is the time not spent on25
accumulating but on other processes, such as perception and motor responses.26
Evidence accumulation successfully explains many features of simple, fast, perceptual choice including the shape27
of the distribution of reaction times3, speed-accuracy trade-offs4, and fast errors5. It is also neurally plausible6.28
More recently, evidence accumulation models have been successfully applied to value-based choice, where partici-29
pants choose their preferred option7. Extending the evidence accumulation framework from perceptual to preferential30
choices resulted in minimal changes to the model assumptions. Fundamentally the processes remain the same, but31
with money or subjective value ratings replacing perceptual properties such as luminance or motion coherence when32
defining the drift rate.33
Whilst evidence accumulation processes have been successful in predicting preferential choice, some fundamen-34
tal differences between value-based and perceptual choices are not always addressed. Particularly important are the35
assumptions made about the drift rate. In perceptual paradigms, evidence is often dynamic and stochastic, such as in36
the case of random dot kinematograms (RDK) where participants estimate the average direction of jittering dots8. In37
such tasks, longer deliberation times allow participants to build a more accurate representation of the options by inte-38
grating the stimulus signal for longer. Contrast this with a common preferential choice task where participants choose39
between two snack items9,10. In this case, the stimuli are static images. Once recognised, longer deliberation times do40
not increase the amount of information that a subject can collect, or improve the accuracy of their representation of41
the options.42
Additionally, in applying these models to preferential choice, the time course of the acquisition of value informa-43
tion has been ignored. In an RDK task participants only need to attend to one input, a single patch of dots, to gain44
knowledge about all possible response options: left vs. right, or up vs. down. This means that evidence is being45
accumulated simultaneously and equally for all possible response options from the onset of the trial. However, in46
a snack choice task, the options must be presented in spatially distinct regions of the display. At the onset of the47
trial the subject knows nothing about the value of any of the options, then must gather information about each option48
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sequentially. Further, stimulus displays are often designed so participants must shift their attention from item to item49
in spatially distinct locations. This means that in preferential choice evidence cannot be accumulated simultaneously50
and equally for the available options.51
Therefore, these preferential choice experiments conflict with the assumptions of evidence accumulation models.52
These models incorrectly assume complete knowledge of item information from early in a choice—here referred to as53
Knowledge At Onset (KAO). The issues of KAO assumptions obviously apply to some perceptual tasks as well, such54
as luminance comparison choice or dot numerosity tasks, where there are multiple dot patches spatially separated.55
However, these issues are more pronounced in the vast majority of preferential choice tasks due to the static stimuli56
and the reduced role of peripheral vision in identifying the more visually complex properties of the options.57
Furthermore, evidence accumulation models are being applied to vastly more complex choices in the preferen-58
tial choice domain. Models such as decision field theory11, leaking competing accumulators12, the Poisson race59
model13, the attentional drift diffusion model9, associative accumulator model14, and the multialternative linear bal-60
listic accumulator model15 have built upon the success of evidence accumulation in simple choice by applying similar61
frameworks to predict risky gamble and multi-attribute choices. The inclusion of many more pieces of information for62
the different attributes means that subjects must acquire much more information, and presumably process this more63
deeply, before a relative drift rate (or other parameters controlling attention switching likelihood etc.) can be known.64
However, all these models still assume full KAO.65
As evidence accumulation models commonly assume some form of non-decision time, it would seem plausible66
that reading and information gathering could be incorporated into the choice process using this parameter. Essentially,67
if this were the case, evidence accumulation would only begin after all the information has been acquired. Indeed,68
similar multi-stage frameworks have been proposed outside of the evidence accumulator literature (16,17 but see18 for69
no changes in fixation pattern over time). These assume that in complex choice, the decision process begins with70
a reading phase prior to the choice process itself. Eye-tracking studies have provided evidence in support of this71
assumption. Commonly, these studies find that participants tend to begin by examining all attributes once, and then72
switch to a different pattern of refixations16,19. Specifically, attention early on tends to follow a systematic left to right,73
or top to bottom pattern, whilst during refixations there is no discernible pattern.74
However, despite the potential compatibility of a reading phase with non-decision time, several pieces of evidence75
suggest this cannot be true. One issue is that of timing. Fitting evidence accumulation models tends to produce76
relatively short estimates for non-decision time periods. If they are estimated at all, they are typically between 100ms77
and 500ms e.g.3,20–22. Since a basic motor response requires 200ms or more to execute and the average length of a78
fixation is around 250ms, there is little time left for reading and information acquisition, even in very simple choices79
where all the information could be read quickly18,23.80
A further issue is that although many studies find a reading order effect from left to right and top to bottom at the81
beginning of a choice, this isn’t consistent with a distinct reading phase that finishes prior to any choice processing16,19.82
This is because participants regularly begin re-fixating information before they have read all the available information,83
and often choose before having attended all the available information18. Therefore, information acquisition patterns84
appear incompatible with a strict interpretation of non-decision time as a reading phase.85
Other families of evidence accumulation models have tried to address these issues by assuming serial information86
search and that decision makers can only attend to one piece of information at a time. Models such as piecewise87
linear ballistic accumulator20 and the attentional drift diffusion model9 assume that the drift rate is dependent upon88
the currently attended information. However, this dependency is incorporated as a bias towards the currently attended89
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Figure 1: Example trials from the poster and currency tasks.
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information, and that the drift rate is still inherently relative (based on a summary difference between all values). That90
is, it is assumed at all times, that the value of all other information is known (KAO) so that relative drift rates can still91
be calculated from onset.92
The question this paper asks is, how well do evidence accumulation models perform if we constrain their assump-93
tions and do not allow information to be used before there is any way a decision maker could know it? That is,94
once we have ruled out clairvoyance, what can we conclude about evidence accumulation? We think that people are95
accumulating—in the sense of gathering the evidence needed to make a choice—for much of the decision time. But96
our stark conclusion is that people are not accumulating—in the evidence accumulation model sense of integrating97
incoming evidence over time, as instantiated, for example, in the drift diffusion model—for most of the time between98
stimulus onset and choice.99
Models100
Our approach to testing the accuracy of evidence accumulation models follows that introduced in Smith et al.24 who101
demonstrated that a logistic regression framework simply and robustly recovers estimates of drift diffusion parameters102
whilst avoiding stochastic simulation. Specifically, this approach relies on predicting the choice proportions using a103
logistic regression. This allows us to test a range of plausible assumptions about the evidence accumulation mechanism104
using the same statistical model. For each assumption, we calculate the accumulated evidence as predicted by the105
attributes on each trial. The difference score is then used as a predictor in the logistic regression predicting choice.106
Specifically we model the choice on each trial in a logistic regression Log Odds(ChooseA) = β0 +β∆∆ where ∆ is107
one of five estimates of the difference between the choice options A and B below.108
Value Difference Model109
The simplest and most common existing assumption is that the drift rate is defined by the difference in value (or110
subjective ratings) between the two options1. This is the assumption of accumulation of complete information from111
the beginning of the trial and of course implies KAO. We use this as our baseline. In multi-attribute choices, we112
assume that an object’s value is represented as the mean value across its attributes.113
To provide a concrete example across each of the following assumptions, we use the hypothetical trial described114
in Figure 2 and accompanying diagram. On this trial, participants had to choose between two options each with 3115
attributes, which were 3 equally likely monetary outcomes (labelled a, b and c for Option 1 and x, y and z for Option116
2). Formally, the value difference on this trial is given by117
∆VALUE =
Va + Vb + Vc
3
− Vx + Vy + Vz
3
(1)
where Vi indicates the value of attribute i. Therefore, on this trial ∆VALUE equals (21+78+84)/3−(85+76+32)/3 =118
−3.33.119
3
Fixation
number
Value
fixated
Values known
Vˆa Vˆb Vˆc Vˆx Vˆy Vˆz
pre-fixation + 50 50 50 50 50 50
1 21 21 50 50 50 50 50
2 78 21 78 50 50 50 50
3 85 21 78 50 85 50 50
4 76 21 78 50 85 76 50
5 84 21 78 84 85 76 50
6 78 21 78 84 85 76 50
21
85
78 84
76 32
a b c
x y z
Option 1
Option 2
Figure 2: Illustrative fixation data for a single trial in the lottery experiment. In the table, the first row represents
the estimated prior. Then, the subsequent rows show the six fixations to areas of interest representing the possible
monetary rewards on this trial. The pattern of fixations is shown in the diagram on the right by the arrows between the
nodes representing the attributes. Note the participant fixated twice on attribute b and never fixated on attribute z.
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Fixation Weighted Value Difference Model120
Another common assumption is that evidence is accumulated based upon the information currently attended at121
each point in time9,25–27. Here we take the stronger assumption, that the drift rate is solely determined by the currently122
attended information. Essentially, this removes any reliance on KAO as the decision maker is only accumulating123
currently attended information. We call this moment-by-moment shift in drift rate fixation weighted value difference.124
Here, we implement this by multiplying each value by the number of times it was fixated in a trial and divide by the125
total number of fixations to each item. We then take the difference between them.126
For the example trial in Figure 2, this is would be formally represented as127
∆WEIGHTED VALUE =
1
N
 ∑
i∈a,b,c
fiVi −
∑
j∈x,y,z
fjVj
 (2)
where fi is the frequency of fixations to attribute i across the trial and N =
∑
i∈a,b,c fi +
∑
j∈x,y,z fj is the to-128
tal number of fixations. Therefore, on the example trial ∆WEIGHTED VALUE = 1/6 ((1× 21 + 2 × 78 + 1 × 84) −129
(1× 85 + 1 × 76 + 0 × 32)) = 16.67 (because 78 is fixated twice and 32 is never fixated).130
Updating Value Difference Model131
Another assumption is that whilst accumulation starts at the beginning of the trial, it is initially based upon initial132
a priori expectations about the attribute values. Then, as information is learned about each option, the drift rate is133
updated to represent the currently known values20. Thus, the information acquired on each fixation in this model134
represents the change in drift rate, whereas in the Fixation Weighted Value Difference Model above it represents the135
drift rate itself.136
The Updating Value Difference Model is equivalent to a Bayesian updating as information is received. The prior137
would be a uniform distribution over all attribute values. Then, when the attribute is fixated, this collapses to a point138
posterior distribution at the value of the attribute.139
Here, we implement this using the prior v which is set to the mean of all values across the experiment (using140
the mean is sufficient instead of a uniform distribution because of the linear combination of values). In our Figure 2141
example, this means the value of each lottery payout is assumed to be 50: the average payout value. (Other values for142
v account for less variance and thus this experiment-mean assumption is the best version of this model. Additionally,143
in Appendix A we considered a model where v was learned over previous trials—this made no difference.) As each144
attribute is fixated, its value is updated from the prior 50, to the true value and the drift rate is recalculated. Thus for145
each fixation we calculate the estimated value difference and then average this over fixations:146
∆UPDATING VALUE =
1
N
(
N∑
n=1
[
Vˆa + Vˆb + Vˆc
3
− Vˆx + Vˆy + Vˆz
3
]
n
)
(3)
where [Vˆi]n is the participant’s understanding of value for attribute i on fixation n and N is the total number of
fixations. Therefore, on this example trial,
∆UPDATING VALUE =
1
6
(
[
1
3
(21 + 50 + 50)− 1
3
(50 + 50 + 50)]1+
[
1
3
(21 + 78 + 50)− 1
3
(50 + 50 + 50)]2+
[
1
3
(21 + 78 + 50)− 1
3
(85 + 50 + 50)]3+
[
1
3
(21 + 78 + 50)− 1
3
(85 + 76 + 50)]4+
[
1
3
(21 + 78 + 84)− 1
3
(85 + 76 + 50)]5+
[
1
3
(21 + 78 + 84)− 1
3
(85 + 76 + 50)]6
)
= −10.22
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Final Value Difference Model147
Some have argued that there are multiple stages of decision making19,28. Most typically, this takes the form of a148
reading phase, followed by a decision phase that begins only once sufficient information has been collected or attended.149
This is implemented here by using only the information that a participant has acquired by the end of the trial. If a150
participant has fixated on all of the attributes by the end of the trial, this predictor is identical to the difference in151
expected value. However, if a participant has not fixated on all of the values, then the unfixated attributes are assumed152
to have a value v. Note that this model excludes information about when in the trial information was attended.153
∆FINAL VALUE =
[
Vˆa + Vˆb + Vˆc
3
− Vˆx + Vˆy + Vˆz
3
]
n=N
(4)
where N is the final fixation on that trial. Therefore, for the example trial ∆FINAL VALUE would be equal to 1/3(21 +154
78 + 84) − 1/3(85 + 76 + 50) = −9.33.155
Should this model prove as good a fit as the earlier models, then we will be forced to conclude that knowing when156
attributes are attended—either in the Fixation Weighted Value Difference Model by determining the instantaneous157
drift rate or in the Updating Value Difference Model by determining how the drift rate is updated—is not relevant for158
predicting choices.159
Final Value Difference Plus History Model160
Our last model is a more general test of whether it matters when an attribute value was acquired. Therefore, we161
also include time known terms for each attribute (a, b, c, x, y, z). Formally, this is defined as162
∆HISTORY = ∆FINAL VALUE +
∑
i∈a,b,c,x,y,z
pi(Vi − v) (5)
where pi equals the proportion of fixations for which the participant knew the attribute value.163
The comparison of the final value different model with the final value difference plus history model tests whether,164
over and above the attribute information available by the final fixation, it matters how long the information about each165
attribute was known.166
Attention Model167
All the assumptions tested above share the property that the effect of attention depends upon the value of the168
information attended in some way. However, there is reason to believe that attention biases choice, independent169
of option values10,29— that more attention to an alternative increases the probability of choosing that alternative.170
Therefore we calculate the proportion of time where attention is directed to each option.171
Here, attentional bias is defined as172
A =
Ta + Tb + Tc
Ta + Tb + Tc + Tx + Ty + Tz
(6)
where Ti is the amount of time in milliseconds the participant fixated within the area of interest around attribute i on173
each trial.174
We estimate an additional version of each of the above models that includes the attentional bias A as a predictor.175
Results176
Figure 3 shows the results of fitting these models to four binary choice experiments. In two of the experiments,177
participants chose between two options, each represented by a single image. In the food experiment, participants178
selected their preferred snack food from two photographs and in the posters experiment, they chose which of two179
images from the International Affective Picture System30 they preferred. In these experiments, participants rated each180
stimulus on a Likert scale, which enabled us to estimate the models using each participant’s individual ratings. In the181
other two experiments, participants chose between two multi-attribute options: lotteries consisting of three possible182
tickets. In the currency experiment, these lotteries were presented in different currencies on each trial (£, Y andQ). In183
the lottery experiment, all choices were presented as unitless “points”. All experiments except the poster experiment184
were incentivised. In Figure 3 the bars indicate the variance in choices explained by each model (Nagelkerke pseudo185
R2) with (light) and without (dark) a main effect of attention.186
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Figure 3: Model summaries for each experiment. Dark bars indicate the variance in choices captured by the model is
measured by Nagelkerke pseudo R2. Light bars include an additional main effect of attention.
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The most striking result is that, for every experiment, the final value model explains more variance than the updat-187
ing value model. That is, model fits worsen when they assume that the drift rate value is updated as new information is188
learned. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the final value plus history model accounts for no more variance189
than the final value (alone) model. In other words, adding in information about when an attribute value was acquired190
does not improve model performance. Furthermore, using this information to constrain accumulation models actually191
results in a substantially worse fit to the data.192
In three of the four experiments, the final value model explains more variance than the fixation weighted model.193
That is, assuming that evidence is only accumulated based upon the currently attended information makes the model194
fit worse.195
This is not true in the posters experiment, where the fixation weighted model explains more variance than the final196
value model. This is because there is a main effect of attention that is more than twice as large in the poster experiment197
than in the other experiments. The fixation weighted model is able to capture this large main effect of attention using198
the attention-by-value interaction10, but the other models cannot capture this main effect. Thus the fixation weighted199
model is doing well not because people are weighting fixations, but because the model is able to capture a main effect200
of attention. (Our data do not allow us to say why there is a large main effect of attention in the posters experiment–we201
speculate this may be because of the inherent value of looking at pleasurable images–but this is not critical for the202
argument we make here.)203
The value difference model accounts for similar amounts of variance as the final value model because, on the204
vast majority of trials in these tasks, participants view all of the attribute values and on these full-view trials the value205
difference model prediction is the final value model prediction. That is, when all values are known, the value difference206
model and the final value model are identical. And finding that the value difference model outperforms the fixation207
weighted model and the updating value model again shows that using information about when attribute information is208
gained is not useful for predicting choice.209
Discussion210
Here, we identify that a key assumption of evidence accumulation models is inherently impossible and wrong: that211
decision makers have perfect knowledge at the onset of a choice—KAO. We examine a number of alternative evidence212
accumulation models which remove this assumption. These alternatives retain the attractive properties of evidence213
accumulation models, including neural plausibility and the ability to predict choices and reaction times simultaneously.214
However, the results across four experiments show that the best performing models are ones which ignore the time215
when information is acquired.216
This has serious implications for accumulation-based models of value-based choice7,9,12–15,31. We suggest that217
accumulation models, although they fit choice and reaction time data well, are fundamentally missing something.218
We are forced to a strong conclusion: If adding knowledge about when information becomes available to evidence219
accumulation models makes their fit worse, we must conclude that, if there is an accumulation process, it does not220
begin until about the time the final fixation is made. Effectively, our result confines the accumulation process to a221
small fraction of time at the end of a choice, because allowing it to start any earlier results in significantly poorer222
choice predictions. (Appendix B considers further how early, exactly, the accumulation process could start.) While the223
starting point for many avenues of research is an accumulation model, we should, perhaps, be looking more stringently224
at testing those underlying assumptions.225
There are additional implications for research using process tracing methods32. A great deal of work has focused226
upon fitting models of choice to reaction time data, information search, and eye-tracking. However, these results227
suggest that this process tracing work may have been based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the underlying228
process itself. For example, how are we to interpret findings testing the effect of choice difficulty upon drift rates229
and reaction times in light of the suggestion that evidence is not being accumulated over the majority of the decision230
time? This is not to say that process tracing is not valuable, but that research on properties of that process is very231
often structured around a particular model (or class of model). Such work is therefore inherently reliant upon the232
assumptions underlying that model, and when those assumptions prove to be faulty, the conclusions of process tracing233
efforts need to be revisited. A preferential approach might be to increase focus on model free tests, and independent234
characterisations of process data.235
The conclusion from this paper is that it is perhaps futile to fit accumulator models like multialternative decision236
field theory31, leaking competing accumulators12, multialternative decision by sampling33, the Poisson race model13,237
8
the attention drift diffusion model9,27, the associative accumulator model14, and the multialternative linear ballistic238
accumulator model15 to choice data from attribute by alternative matrices of multi-attribute choice options. For ex-239
ample, the model comparisons reviewed by Busemeyer et al.7, which include Rieskamp34, Scheibehenne et al.35,240
Berkowitsch et al.36, Hancock et al.37, Bhatia14, Trueblood et al.15, Hotaling et al.38, Turner et al.39, Krajbich et241
al.9,40 and Noguchi and Stewart33 should be abandoned. This is because we show that much of the time taken to make242
a choice in multiattribute choice tasks is not time in which people are accumulating evidence—while in all of these243
models reaction time differences across choices are accounted for as differences in accumulation. Instead much of244
the choice time is for cognitive processes which precede the accumulation process. Thus the problem is that much245
modeling is targeting the accumulation process, but this is only a small fraction of the cognitive operations—at least as246
measured by time. This means that much of the cognitive processing in multiattribute choice remains to be explored247
and modelled.248
Methods249
Aside from the variations noted below, the experiments proceeded as follows. Participants were recruited from the250
University of Warwick participation pool and were paid for their participation. To limit movement, participants used a251
chin rest placed approximately 70cm away from the screen. Monocular eye movements were recorded at 500Hz with252
an EyeLink 1000 Plus (SR Research, Osgoode, ON, Canada) eye-tracker. Fixations were identified by the eye-tracker253
software using velocity algorithms. Participants initially underwent a 13 point calibration and validation cycle of the254
eye-tracker, which was repeated throughout the experiments. Stimulus presentation was controlled by MATLAB using255
Psychtoolbox extensions41,42. Trials were excluded if their reaction times were greater than 1.5 times the interquartile256
range above the mean reaction time across all trials within the experiment or less than 200ms.257
Food43258
Useable data was collected from 41 participants. Data was excluded for 4 additional subjects because of poor eye259
tracking data quality (as indicated by the proportion of time during trials where eye gaze was detected by the tracker260
being outside of the normal distribution across all participants). The stimuli were pictures of 50 different snack items.261
These were comprised of five types of snack: crisps, fruit candy, sweet carbonated drinks, health and sports drinks,262
and chocolate. This experiment was split into two parts. In the first, the participant rated the desirability of 50 snack263
items on a 1-9 scale. In the second, the 50 stimuli were paired to create 100 binary choice trials. Choice pairs were264
created such that the rating difference between the two items was 3 or less, and so that an individual snack item was265
not present in more than 5 trials. At the end of the experiment one trial was randomly selected and the subject was266
given the item they chose.267
Posters44268
Useable data was collected from 53 participants. The experiment was displayed on a widescreen monitor (1920269
x 1080 resolution, 60Hz refresh). Additional data was collected from 13 participants but 12 were excluded due to a270
programming error and one because their gaze location could be measured for less than 70% of the time across all271
trials. The stimuli were chosen from the International Affective Picture System30. The pictures were all positive in272
affect (average ratings between 5=neutral and 7=mildly positive for both males and females) and had differences in273
value ratings of no more than 1.5 between male and female raters. After visual inspection, a further 7 images were274
removed for containing sexual images and 32 images were removed because they had a portrait aspect ratio. The 200275
stimuli for each participant were randomly sampled without replacement from the 253 pictures that met these criteria.276
All participants completed binary choice and strength-of-preference tasks in a counterbalanced order. Here, we277
only analyse the binary choice data. Two landscape pictures (each 514×384px) were displayed side by side following278
a fixation cross. The response scale was presented horizontally centered, below the stimuli. For the binary choice279
task, two labels (“Option A” and “Option B”) were shown underneath the appropriate stimuli. The current choice was280
signified by a red, square marker (30 × 30px) above the label. The marker was initially centered equidistant between281
the two images. To respond, the participants had to press the left mouse button. Reaction times were measured from282
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the start of the trial to the mouse click onset. A blank, black screen was displayed for 500ms between each trial.283
Finally, participants had to rate their overall liking for each picture on a Likert scale, vertically displayed to the left of284
each image. The eye-tracker was recalibrated at the beginning of each condition and then after every 25 trials.285
Lottery45286
Useable data was collected from 54 participants. The data of an additional 5 subjects was excluded: 1 because they287
failed to complete the task within a reasonable time frame and withdrew, and 4 because of poor quality eye tracking288
data. The stimuli were gambles with three equally likely outcomes. Because the outcomes were equally likely, no289
probabilities or likelihoods were displayed during the trials themselves. For each trial, two gambles were presented,290
one on the top and one on the bottom of the screen. The three payouts of a single gamble were presented in horizontal291
alignment and were displayed as white text within a solid grey circle. This was done to reduce the discriminability of292
the numbers in peripheral vision, so that subjects had to directly fixate the number to determine its value. Each gamble293
consisted of three possible outcomes which were always one low value (10-30), one medium value (40-60), and one294
high value (70-90). The specific values were randomly drawn on each trial.295
The main task consisted of 100 trials. Trials were presented in a random order, with trials from the different296
conditions intermixed. Each trial began with a fixation cross displayed in the centre of the screen, and the trial only297
began once the subject was looking at the fixation cross. Trials were split into 3 different conditions: no change, low298
to high, and high to low. There were 34 trials in the no change condition, and 33 in each of the other two. Here, we299
only analyse the no change condition. The eye-tracker was recalibrated at the beginning of the main block and then300
after every 20 trials.301
Currency44302
Usable data was collected from 46 participants from the California Institute of Technology participation pool.303
Additional data had been collected from 14 participants but four were excluded due to incomplete data (they ran over304
the experiment slot) and 10 because of poor eye tracking accuracy (their gaze location could be measured for less305
than 68% of the time averaged across all trials). The stimuli were two gambles with three equally likely outcomes,306
presented at the top and bottom of the screen. The three payouts of each option were presented side-by-side as307
white text within a solid grey circle. There were two within-subject conditions, counterbalanced for order. In the308
commensurate condition, there were 42 trials, in a third of trials all attributes were displayed in pounds, yen and “Q”309
respectively. In the incommensurate condition, on every trial, the three attributes of each option were presented in the310
three difference currencies. Here, we only analyse the commensurate condition. Participants were told the exchange311
rates for pounds, yen and Q to dollars. Here we analysed the equivalent dollar values. The eye-tracker was calibrated312
at the beginning and every 21 trials. Participants pressed the up key if they preferred the top lottery, and the down key313
if they preferred the bottom lottery. Areas of interested were defined horizontal distance of 320 pixels, and a vertical314
distance of 340 pixels apart on the screen.315
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Appendices409
Appendix A410
Here, we compare updating value models that make different assumptions about the prior value for unattended411
attributes. In the updating value model, we assume that participants use the experiment-average attribute value as412
a static prior for all trials. However, this assumption obviously assumes some clairvoyance at the beginning of the413
experiment. Therefore, here we also include a model which assumes that participants use as a prior the updating mean414
of all the values they have seen on earlier trials in the experiment. Figure A1 shows that adopting this more realistic415
assumption makes almost no difference to model fit.416
Posters Currency
Food Lottery
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Updating Value Model
 (Updating Prior)
Updating Value Model
 (Static Prior)
Updating Value Model
 (Updating Prior)
Updating Value Model
 (Static Prior)
R2
Figure A1: Comparison of updating models assuming two different types of prior across the four datasets.
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Appendix B417
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Figure B1: Updating value model split on the basis of each fixation averaged across trials.
The fixation weighted value difference and the updating value difference model both assume that people accu-418
mulate attribute value information as it is attended. The final value difference model assumes that accumulation is419
deferred until all of the information that will be acquired has been acquired. Finding that this final value difference420
model fits better allows us to reject the idea that accumulation begins as information is first acquired.421
Here we explore the possibility that information acquisition begins later than the first fixations, but begins before422
the fixation upon which all of the information that will be acquired is acquired. To explore the issue of when accumu-423
lation starts directly, we split each trial into early and late fixations and model separately the early and late fixations424
with the updating value difference model.425
Figure B1 splits each trial into early and late fixations. We took the late fixations and ran the updating value426
difference model as if accumulation only occurred during the late fixations. The “after-split” lines in Figure B1427
show how model fit changes accumulation is assumed to start earlier and earlier (from right to left). Assuming that428
accumulation starts earlier than the last fixations makes the model fits slightly worse, or makes little difference. We429
have also included, for completeness, “before-split” lines which show what happens in accumulation updates only on430
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Table B1: Estimates of time spent accumulating. Columns from left to right: 1) mean reaction time, 2) average fixation
length, 3) mean estimation of t0 from the drift diffusion model, 4) mean time spent accumulating according to the drift
diffusion model, 5) best fitting number of fixations from the end of the trial upon which accumulation starts, 6) the
time we estimate participants start accumulating and 7) the percentage of trial in which the two approaches disagree
about whether accumulation is taking place.
Experiment means DDM means Our estimation
RT (ms) Fixation length (ms) t0 (ms) Accumulation time (ms) Best-fitting split Accumulation (ms) Discrepancy
Food 2210 242 532 1678 1 242 65%
Posters 3514 264 897 2617 3 792 52%
Lottery 6516 251 1885 4631 3 753 60%
Currency 14574 385 2357 12217 1 385 81%
the early fixations before the split. Assuming accumulation only during the early fixations provides a very poor fit.431
We take the as the best-fitting split the point at which theR2 value is highest. This point is, for example, 3 fixations432
back in the lottery experiment. Assuming accumulation starts earlier makes the model fit worse. Thus we have an433
estimate of how early accumulation starts according to the updating value-difference model.434
We have also estimated the drift diffusion model (DDM) for each experiment for each participant. The t0 parameter435
provides an estimate of the point at which accumulation starts according to the DDM. We contrast DDM and the436
updating value model estimates of the start time below.437
We fitted the DDM to the response, reaction time and rating data (when applicable–i.e. food and posters) for each438
participant. We calculated model fits in R46 using the optim function with the method “L-BFGS-B.” The closed-439
form model was provided by the rtdists package47. Code for these model fits is available on OSF. The threshold440
separation a, drift rate v, non-decision time t0, and inter-trial variability of non-decision time st0 were estimated. The441
other parameters were set to the default provided by the package. We limited the search procedure to only consider442
positive values for a, t0 and st0. To get the best possible estimates, the model was fit to each participant’s data443
10 times with random starting parameters. The best parameters for each participant were those that maximised the444
log-likelihood of the responses and timing.445
Table B1 shows that our estimates for the onset of accumulation are very different from those estimated by the446
drift diffusion model—we estimate that people begin accumulating much later than is estimated by t0 in the DDM.447
Taking the food experiment as an example, we have a mean reaction time of 2210ms and an average fixation duration448
of 242ms. Based on the drift diffusion models fits, we have an estimated t0 of 532ms, which is the estimated time449
at which accumulation begins. Subtracting this from the mean reaction time, we have an estimate of 1678ms as the450
average time in the trial during which accumulation is taking place according to the drift diffusion model. Using451
the updating value model, we selected the best-fitting number of fixations back from the end of the trial as the start452
of accumulation. For the food experiment, this is one fixation back. Thus we can also estimate the average time in453
the trial of 242ms during which accumulation is taking place according to the updating value evidence accumulation454
model (i.e., for the duration of the last fixation) The last column in Table B1 reports the fraction of the total reaction455
time where the drift diffusion model fit assumes participants are accumulating but our updating value model fitting456
assumes that they are not accumulating (1678 − 242)/2210 = 65%. In every case, over half of the reaction time is457
time when the drift diffusion model assumes accumulation is taking place, but our modeling with the updating value458
model indicates that it is not.459
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Figure B2: Reaction times and non-decision time t0 for each participant.Participants are arbitrarily ordered from
slowest to fastest.
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